Ideas equivocadas sobre la depresión y su tratamiento (I) by Sanz Fernández, Jesús & García Vera, María Paz
n September 8, 2015, in the digital version of the
Spanish newspaper El Mundo (elmundo.es), an article
was published entitled “Misconceptions about
depression” that referred to another with the same title from
DMedicina (dmedicina.com), an Internet portal specialized in
health and published by the same multimedia communication
group that publishes El Mundo (Redacción de DMedicina
[Editorial team of DMedicina], 2015). Currently, this portal is
called CuidatePlus (http://www.cuidateplus.com) and on
October 1, 2016 it re-published the same article (Redacción de
CuidatePlus [Editorial team of CuidatePlus], 2016).
Unfortunately, most of the misconceptions about depression in
the article were not as such, that is, they were not wrong in the
light of current scientific knowledge. Moreover, both the
information and the arguments provided to refute these
misconceptions were plagued by erroneous statements and
data.
The fact that healthcare information on the Internet is full of
errors and inaccuracies and that the quality of websites sharing
healthcare information is low is nothing new (e.g., Conesa
Fuentes, Aguinaga Ontoso, & Hernández Morante, 2011).
However, the errors, inaccuracies and low quality begin to be
worrying when the information is published in the digital
newspaper that is the second most widely read in Spain and the
third most widely read in Spanish in the world (El País, 2015),
because these errors and inaccuracies could reach millions of
people. According to comScore, the official measurer of market
audiences in Spain, in September 2015, the month in which the
above article was published, almost 13 million people in Spain
and more than 10 million in the rest of the world accessed
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elmundo.es using personal computers and mobile devices.
When some of the statements include declarations (e.g.,
“psychotherapy cures depression”) that are not only not wrong,
but also their being presented as erroneous could have very
negative consequences for people with depression and,
moreover, they discredit one of the main professional activities
of psychologists and produce unfair competition in favor of
other healthcare professionals, then those statements require a
robust and well-founded response from psychology. If,
moreover, some of these statements or some of their variants
(e.g., “psychotherapy is effective for mild or moderate
depression, but also for severe depression”) are also wrongly
considered to be “misconceptions” by a large number of
healthcare professionals, including a good number of
psychologists, it is worthwhile for these well-founded responses
to reach the greatest number of psychologists and other
healthcare professionals.
This was precisely the objective of this paper and its second
part (Sanz & García-Vera, 2017), for which the ideas on
depression and its treatment presented by the Editorial team of
DMedicina (2015) will be reviewed in the light of current
scientific literature, as well as some variants of these ideas that
appear in some clinical practice guidelines and
psychopathology or psychiatry manuals of prestige and wide
diffusion (e.g., American Psychiatric Association, 2010;
González Pinto, López Peña, & Zorrilla Martínez, 2009; Clinical
Practice Guideline Working Group on Adult Depression
Management, 2014; Vallejo Ruiloba, 2005; Vallejo &
Urretavizcaya, 2015).
Since the article in DMedicina presented assertions (e.g.,
“psychotherapy cures depression”), which, for the most part, it
classified as false, and since both this paper and its second part
(Sanz & García- Vera, 2017) will argue that what is false is
precisely to qualify them as false, in order to avoid these double
negations that could lead to confusion for the reader, the present
work and its second part will directly present the ideas defended
by DMedicina (e.g., “psychotherapy does not cure depression”)
or some clinical practice guidelines or manuals of
psychopathology or psychiatry (e.g., “psychotherapy is not
effective for severe depression, but only for mild or moderate
depression”), and these ideas will be contrasted with the current
scientific knowledge.
In this first paper, the ideas about the nature of depression
advocated by DMedicina (see Table 1) will be checked, while
the second paper (Sanz & García-Vera, 2017) covers the ideas
related to the treatment of depression which are defended both
by this Internet portal and some clinical guidelines and manuals
of psychiatry and psychopathology of prestige and wide
diffusion.
Since these ideas do not specify the type of population referred
to, it will be understood –as is customary in psychopathology
when there is no express mention of age– that they all refer to
depression in adults and, therefore, all of the data and
conclusions of this work and its second part will refer to this
population. However, the lack of specification on the type of
population to which they refer is already an important limitation
of the ideas defended by DMedicina and by these clinical
guidelines and psychiatry/psychopathology manuals, since, for
example, there are important differences in the area of  
treatment of depression among adults, children and adolescents.
In fact, if such ideas are wrong in relation to adult depression,
most are even more so in relation to depression in children and
adolescents. For example, if the current scientific literature
indicates, as it will be seen in the second part of this work, that
psychotherapy is just as effective as antidepressant medication
for adult depression and that, therefore, the idea is false that
psychotherapy is less effective than antidepressant medication
for adult depression, the same literature also indicates that
psychotherapy is the only treatment that until now has been
shown to be efficacious for depression in children and
adolescents and that, in this type of population, no
pharmacological treatment has had its efficacy fully
demonstrated (García-Vera & Sanz, 2016).
MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT DEPRESSION
When everything in life goes well, you can get depressed
The arguments made by DMedicina to defend the idea that a
person can suffer a depression despite everything in their life
going well are the following:
The causes of depression (the reason for the
appearance of the illness) should not be confused with
the triggers (factors that reveal that someone is sick). A
person may be “gestating” a depression and trying to
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* Although the supposedly correct answer and the one backed by the scientific literature
coincide, the arguments and data offered to support the former (see text) do not coincide
with those obtained from the scientific literature and perpetuate misconceptions about
depression and its treatment.
Idea
1. When everything in life is
going well, you can get
depressed
2. Depression is a chronic
disease that never disappears
altogether
3. There are no people who fake
depression to get out of work
4. Optimistic and extraverted
people get depressed equally













justify the symptoms (for example, overwork would
justify apathy and exhaustion). However, in the face of a
vital event such as the death of a relative or a job loss,
the disease breaks out. Not everyone who suffers from
these triggers gets depressed, however, a very large
percentage of people who do not experience adverse
personal circumstances do. (Redacción de DMedicina
[Editorial team of DMedicina], 2015, para.7)
The Editorial team of DMedicina is right to say that when
everything in life is good for a person, there is still the possibility
that even then this person can be depressed. However, this
argument is partially erroneous, since it suggests that the
relationship between stressors and depression is weaker than it
really is, and the Editorial team also refers to the idea that
depression is a disease and therefore it is dependent on a
supposed biological alteration and independent of the vital
circumstances. In fact, it is false that a very large percentage of
people who do not suffer from stressors become depressed. The
presence of previous stressors in people that suffer from
depression tends to be the norm, rather than the exception. In a
review of the scientific literature in this regard, it was concluded
emphatically that “stressors are 2.5 times more likely in
depressed patients compared to controls, and that in community
samples, 80% of depressive cases were preceded by major life
events (...) the recent evidence based on sound methods of stress
assessment and novel designs strongly suggests that most
episodes of major depression are preceded by stressful life
events (although most people do not become depressed even if
they experience a negative life event)” (Hammen, 2005, p.294-
295).
In conclusion, since the existence of negative life events
increases the risk of depression, it should be considered that the
idea that when everything in life is good for a person, they can
be depressed, is FALSE IN PART, since in those conditions one
is less likely to suffer from depression.
But beyond the erroneous arguments and data on the
relationship between stressors and depression, what underlies
the argumentation of the Editorial team of DMedicina is the
hypothesis, as yet unproven, that depression is a disease, that is,
it is caused by some type of structural or functional alteration of
the organism and, therefore, it can only be treated with drugs
and, consequently, only the physicians can treat it.  This
hypothesis is shared by many health professionals and there is
nothing objectionable about it. However, it is worrying when not
only the media but also some clinical practice guidelines,
psychiatry and psychopathology manuals, or scientific and
professional articles seem to forget their hypothetical nature and
consider, without a doubt, that depression is a disease, not a
construct or concept that researchers and mental health
practitioners use to understand a very complex reality. The
construct of depression serves to understand behaviors related to
sadness, lack of interest, sleep problems, lack of appetite, ideas
about death, etc., which are associated with very high levels of
distress, dysfunction, limitation or incapacity. At present, the
causes of these behaviors are not known for sure and, precisely
for that reason, such behaviors are included under the more
generic term of “mental disorder”, to underline that, accepting
their biopsychosocial multicausality, they may have either
psychological, sociocultural or biological factors as fundamental
causes (García-Vera & Sanz, 2016).
The fact that antidepressant drugs are efficacious in treating
depression in adults, at least for severe depressive disorders
(Fournier et al., 2010), and the fact that they appear to exert
their action by increasing the levels of serotonin, noradrenaline
or dopamine in the brain have led to the development of several
etiological hypotheses about depressive disorders which assume
that these would be the result of a central deficit of these
monoamine neurotransmitters (noradrenergic, serotonergic and
dopaminergic hypotheses, respectively) and which are
collectively referred to as the monoamine hypothesis (Vallejo &
Urretavizcaya, 2015). This reduction in the levels of
monoamines in the central nervous system would in turn be the
result of some type of dysfunction in the processes of synthesis,
storage or release of these neurotransmitters, or abnormalities in
presynaptic or postsynaptic receptors.
However, the arguments and data supporting the monoamine
hypothesis are problematic (Deacon, 2013; Delgado, 2000;
France, Lysaker, & Robinson, 2007). Firstly, the response to
antidepressants is not in itself a strong proof that a deficit in
monoamine neurotransmitters is the cause of depression. As
psychiatrists Delgado and Moreno (2000: 5) pointed out: “some
have argued that depression may be due to a deficiency of NE
[norepinephrine or noradrenaline] or 5-HT [serotonin], because
the enhancement of noradrenergic or serotonergic
neurotransmission improves the symptoms of depression.
However, this is akin to saying that because a rash on one’s arm
improves with the use of a steroid cream, the rash must be due
to a steroid deficiency.”
Secondly, the results of studies that have evaluated monoamine
levels in depressed people and compared them with those of
normal people have not consistently found lower levels in the
former, as would be expected from the monoamine deficiency
hypothesis. While some studies have found that some groups of
patients with depression (e.g., those with depression with
melancholic symptoms) have lower levels of serotonin or
noradrenaline than non-depressed people, others have found
similar levels in patients with depressive disorders and in non-
depressed people (Delgado, 2000; Delgado & Moreno, 2000;
Gjerris, 1988). Recently, however, a meta-analysis that
compared levels of serotonin transporters in patients with
depression and in healthy people (Kambeitz & Howes, 2015),
based on the results of in vivo studies with neuroimaging, found
reduced levels of serotonin transporters in different areas of the
brain (e.g., the striatum, amygdala and brainstem), but not in
the hypothalamus or thalamus. Taking into account the results of
post-mortem studies, in the same meta-analysis, conversely,
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different levels of serotonin transporters were not found in either
the brainstem, frontal cortex or hippocampus.
Thirdly, the results of monoamine-lowering studies are also
inconsistent. In these studies the levels of monoamines in the
central nervous system are temporarily decreased through
dietary restrictions or the administration of a substance, and
later, when the levels have been recovered, the effects of these
changes on the mood are measured (Delgado, 2000). The
monoamine hypothesis would predict that the reduction of
serotonin, noradrenaline or dopamine levels would produce a
decrease in mood in the individuals. Ruhé, Mason and Schene
(2007) meta-analytically reviewed the studies on this subject
and found a decrease in mood in healthy individuals with a
history of major depressive disorder and in non-medicated
patients with major depressive disorder in remission, but not in
healthy individuals without a history of depression.
In summary, therefore, the results of the studies that have tested
the predictions of the monoamine hypothesis, although
suggestive, are inconsistent and, in any case, indicate
alterations in the levels of monoamines in some groups of people
with depression or with risk factors for depression, but not in
others. Consequently, such studies indicate that monoamine
deficiency by itself is not a sufficient explanation of the causes of
depression and that the role of serotonin, noradrenaline and
dopamine neurotransmission systems in the origin and
maintenance of depression is more complex than initially
thought. In fact, in spite of the high number of possible
biological abnormalities that have been studied as potential
biological markers for the diagnosis of depression (more than
25 according to Vallejo & Urretavizcaya, 2015), including
various measures of the activity of monoamines, there is
currently no biological test with sufficient sensitivity and
specificity to diagnose depressive disorders and consequently
neither the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000)
nor the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) nor the
ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1992) include such
biological markers among the diagnostic criteria for these
disorders.
In conclusion, the concept of illness implies the existence of a
structural or functional alteration of the organism that is the
cause of a certain health problem, but these biological causes
have not yet been found for depression. For this reason DSM-IV-
TR, DSM-5 and ICD-10 refer to depression using the term
“disorder” (e.g., major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder,
persistent depressive disorder, recurrent depressive disorder,
etc.), and not “illness”, since the concept of a mental disorder is
open to the possibility that a person’s problematic behavior is
due to a biological alteration, but also to a behavioral or
psychological dysfunction and, that these conditions can be
defined more correctly as a behavioral or psychological pattern
of clinical significance due fundamentally to psychological or
sociocultural causes (García-Vera & Sanz, 2016). Of course, to
say that there is no solid evidence to indicate the existence of
clear biological causes for depressive disorders does not mean
that hypotheses about their biological causes as well as potential
biological markers of disease must not be proposed and
investigated, as is currently being done profusely. What this
simply means is that, accepting the biopsychosocial
multicausality of depressive disorders, the question of the
fundamental causes of these disorders is unresolved and open to
numerous hypotheses of many different kinds (biological,
psychological, and sociocultural). In short, at present the idea
that depression is a disease is simply a hypothesis and a
hypothesis that, in any case, would only cover some types of
depressive disorders. In fact, even the question of specifically
which of these types of depressive disorders are diseases, would
be open to discussion. For this reason, neither the DSM-IV-TR
nor DSM-5 nor ICD-10 distinguish between different types of
depressive disorders based on their causes, beyond the finding
that there may be depressive disorders due to a medical illness
or induced by the consumption of a substance (e.g., none of
these classifications distinguishes between an endogenous type
of major depressive disorder, due to biological causes, and a
neurotic type of major depressive disorder, reactive or due to
psychosocial causes).
Depression is a chronic disease that never disappears
altogether
According to DMedicina, the content of this statement is
FALSE, since:
Chronic diseases accompany the patient from the
moment they contract them until the end of their life.
With current pharmacological treatments, specialists can
eliminate all symptoms of depression in almost 90
percent of cases. If it is correctly treated, depression
remits, although it is true that symptoms may return on
other occasions (Editorial team of DMedicina, 2015,
para. 9).
The Editorial team of DMedicina is correct in saying that it is
FALSE that depression can never disappear altogether, but, once
again, the argument used to justify their answer is plagued with
errors. As discussed in the previous section, today depression
cannot be considered an illness, but must be considered a mental
disorder. On the other hand, it is not true that the rate of efficacy
of the drugs is 90%. I wish it were true. Using as an efficacy
criterion a reduction at post-treatment of at least 50% of the
symptoms present at pre-treatment measured by the Hamilton
Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD) or a post-treatment score on
this scale ranging between  6 and  12, in the meta-analytic
review by Steffens, Krishnan and Helms (1997), response rates
of 48% and 48.6% were found for, respectively, selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and tricyclic
antidepressants, results that coincide with those of more recent
meta-analytic reviews. For example, using as a criterion of
posttreatment efficacy a reduction in the HRSD score of at least
50%, Magni et al. (2013) found a response rate of 52.9% for
DEPRESIÓN Y SU TRATAMIENTO I
172
A r t i c l e s
fluoxetine, the first of the SSRIs introduced on the market, which
soon became the most prescribed antidepressant in many
countries under the trade name Prozac, and a response rate of
53.7% for all other antidepressants. Leucht, Huhn and Leucht
(2012) found a response rate of 56.6% for amitriptyline, a
tricyclic antidepressant in use since 1961 and still among the
most popular in some European countries. Omori et al. (2010)
found a response rate of 52.5% for fluvoxamine, one of the oldest
and most prescribed SSRIs in many countries, and 52.8% for all
other antidepressants. Based on the data presented by Cipriani,
Santilli et al. (2009, Figure 3), a response rate of 62% can be
calculated for escitalopram, one of the latest SSRIs introduced on
the market, and 57.7% for the rest of the SSRIs. Finally, based on
the data of Cipriani et al. (2010, Figures 3 and 10), response
rates of 53.7% and 64.7% can be estimated for sertraline,
another of the latest SSRIs introduced on the market, 53.4%  for
tricyclic antidepressants and 59.6% for the rest of the SSRIs. Thus,
in summary, the efficacy rates of antidepressant drugs at post-
treatment range from 50% to 60%, and even for the drugs
considered by experts today to be the most efficacious –
escitalopram and sertraline (Cipriani, Furukawa et al., 2009)– ,
they do not exceed 65%. In this sense, in a recent meta-analysis
by Johnsen and Friborg (2015) on the results of 43 studies, it was
shown that, at the end of cognitive-behavioral therapy, 57% of
patients could be considered to have recovered from their
depression. Therefore, the efficacy of psychotherapy –at least for
treatments that have solid empirical support, such as cognitive-
behavioral therapy– is no different from that of antidepressant
medication (Sanz & García-Vera, 2017).
There are no people who pretend to be depressed to get leave
from work
The idea that, apart from the exceptions, there are no people
who pretend to be depressed in order to get leave from work is
defended by DMedicina on the basis of the argument that,
“although in some anecdotal cases physicians can be deceived,
it is generally very difficult to simulate depression” (DMedicina,
2015, para. 15).
The statement, as it is formulated, i.e., with that level of
generality, is FALSE, since, with all the limitations and cautions
of the research on the prevalence of malingering (Santamaría
Fernández, 2014), there is no doubt that, at least in the medical-
legal field, there are a not inconsiderable number of people who
simulate depression. For example, Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock
and Condit (2002) estimated, based on a study carried out in
the USA with 131 neuropsychologists, that the simulation rates
for diseases, mental disorders and health problems could range
from 8% in general medical or psychiatry consultations up to
30% in contexts of disability or work compensation claims, and
among the cases of simulation in litigation or indemnification
contexts, almost 15% pretended to have a depressive disorder.
In the same vein, a study carried out in Spain with 161
physicians, the majority of insurance companies in charge of
dealing with work leave cases indicated that their perception is
that 50% of the patients who come for leave due to depression
could be malingering (Santamaría, Capilla Ramírez &
González Ordi, 2013).
However, if what is meant by the assertion in this heading is
that the vast majority of people attending primary care,
psychiatry or psychology clinics who complain of depression are
not simulating this disorder, the simulation rate of 8% provided
by Mittenberg et al. (2002) for this context would adequately
justify this.
Regarding the argument that physicians cannot be deceived,
except in very rare cases, and that it is very difficult to simulate
a depression, it is important to note that although there is not
much research on this subject, and even less specifically about
the simulation of depression, studies do seem to indicate the
existence of a bias among clinicians to believe that simulation is
evident to a well-trained professional when, in fact, the data
indicate that “the ‘clinical eye’ is inaccurate in the correct
determination of simulation, which can give rise to a high
number of both false positives and false negatives” and,
furthermore, “the practitioners’ confidence in their ‘clinical eye’
has not proved to be a good predictor of this capacity for
accuracy” (González Ordi, Santamaría-Fernández, & Capilla
Ramírez, 2013, p.10; see also Santamaría Fernández, 2014).
In conclusion, given the not inconsiderable simulation rates in
both ordinary clinical contexts and legal or forensic ones and
given the fallibility of clinical judgment, it should be considered
that the idea that there are no people who fake depression to get
out of work is FALSE.
Optimistic and extraverted people get depressed as much as
those who are not
The DMedicina article argues that optimistic and extraverted
people get depressed equally as much or even more so than
those who are not optimistic or extraverted, affirming that
“precisely the personality profile that is most extraverted and
euphoric is that which has a greater affective load and,
therefore, more risk of suffering a depression “(DMedicina,
2015, para.17).
It is true that optimistic and extraverted people can also get
depressed, but the scientific literature unequivocally points out
that their risk is lower than that of pessimistic and introverted
persons or that of people with other personality traits and,
therefore, the idea that optimistic and extraverted people get
depressed as much or more than people who are not optimistic
or extraverted is FALSE and the argument that DMedicina offers
to defend this idea is also incorrect.  For example, in their meta-
analysis, Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt and Watson (2010)
demonstrated that, in comparison with the control groups (e.g.,
groups of people representative of the general population),
patients with unipolar depression and dysthymia showed
significantly lower levels of extraversion, with large differences
in terms of effect size (Cohen’s d = -0.92 for unipolar depression
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and Cohen’s d = -1.47 for dysthymia), while patients with major
depressive disorder also had lower levels of extraversion,
although the difference was only moderate (d = -0.62) and it
was not statistically significant. In contrast, all groups of patients
with unipolar depression, dysthymia, and major depressive
disorder showed significantly higher levels of neuroticism, all
with large differences compared to control groups (between d =
1.33 for major depression and d = 1.93 for dysthymia).
Regarding optimism, a meta-analysis on its main measure as
a personality trait, the Life Orientation Test, found a negative,
significant and almost large (r = -0.46) relationship between
optimism and depression measured by the Beck Depression
Inventory (Andersson, 1996).  In the same vein, several studies
have found that optimism is a protective factor for the future
onset of depressive symptoms (Giltay, Zitman & Kromhout,
2006; Vickers & Vogeltanz, 2000). Furthermore, in a study with
monozygotic twin pairs in which one of them had suffered from
major depressive disorder at some time in their life, while the
other had not, it was found that, after controlling for a good
number of possible third variables, the existence of a low level
of optimism was one of the characteristics that best distinguished
the twins with major depressive disorder from the twins without
the disorder (Kendler & Gardner, 2001).
In summary, the scientific literature demonstrates that
extraversion and optimism are two personality factors that are
negatively related to depression and, therefore, the idea that
optimistic and extraverted people become depressed equally as
much as or more than people who are neither optimistic nor
extraverted is FALSE, since optimistic and extraverted people
are less likely to suffer from depression.
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper and its second part (Sanz & García-
Vera, 2017) was to analyze, in light of the current scientific
literature, the veracity of ten ideas about depression and its
treatment that are defended in the widely disseminated media
on the Internet and even in some prestigious clinical practice
guidelines and psychopathology and psychiatry manuals. Of
the four ideas on the nature of depression analyzed in this
paper, three are considered by these media to be true or
partially true and the remainder are considered to be false.
However, according to the current scientific literature, the three
true or partially true ideas are actually false or partially false,
and the remainder are actually false, but for reasons other than
those argued in the media (see Table 1). In summary, contrary
to the ideas defended by these media: a) depression is
considered a mental disorder, not a mental illness; b) the
existence of a biological cause is simply another hypothesis, not
a reality that has been empirically verified unequivocally; c)
negative life events increase the risk of depression while
extraversion and optimism diminish it, and d) there are small,
but not insignificant, rates of depression simulation in both
ordinary and legal or forensic clinical contexts.
The problem with these divergences between what the scientific
literature says about depression and what the ideas and
arguments of some media say about it is that the latter present
depression as a disease, when this conceptualization is currently
only a hypothesis. In doing so, these media promote, with no
scientific basis, the medicalization of the treatment of depressive
disorders to the detriment of the application of psychotherapy,
even when the latter, or at least cognitive-behavioral therapy,
has a better efficacy profile than that of antidepressant
medication, as demonstrated in the second part of this work
(Sanz & García-Vera, 2017). In fact, several studies have
shown that an explanation of depression in terms of disease,
such as in terms of the existence of a neurochemical imbalance,
encourages people to be more pessimistic about their possible
recovery and about the efficacy of non-biological treatments
(Deacon & Baird, 2009).
The present paper and its second part confirm again that not
all health information found on the Internet is reliable, even
when it comes from a site specialized in health information
(Conesa Fuentes et al., 2011; see, however, Mayer, Leis &
Sanz, 2009, for a more positive assessment of quality in some
specific healthcare areas). In fact, DMedicina and its current
version, CuidatePlus, are health portals that subscribe to the
principles of the Health on Net code of conduct (HON;
http://www.hon.ch). HON is an NGO founded in 1995 and
accredited by the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations. Its code of conduct, HONcode, offers a consensual
standard to protect citizens from misinformation about health
and is the most internationally widespread quality seal (Mayer
et al., 2009). This code of conduct supposedly guarantees the
authority of the content (i.e. the news and advice published on
the portal are provided by medical professionals) and its
justification (i.e., the treatments, products and services
mentioned in the portal are backed by scientific and referenced
information). This is more worrying since it ultimately refers to
the reliability of these medical professionals and this scientific
and referenced information (e.g., clinical practice guidelines,
psychiatry or psychopathology manuals), which, in some cases
and as will be seen in the second part of this paper, also
perpetuate ideas that do not correspond to current knowledge
about depression and its treatment.
However, despite these limitations, this work and its second
part do not intend to recommend that mental health information
should not be consulted on the Internet, but that it should be
done critically. To do this, some advice, in the form of a
question, based on that offered by the National Institute of
Aging of the USA (National Institute of Aging, 2014), may be
of great help to both patients and health professionals:
4 Can you easily check who sponsors the website?
4 Is the sponsor of the website an official institution (e.g., a
ministry or health council), a professional association, a
medical school or psychology faculty, or is it related to one of
these entities?
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4 Can you distinguish the sponsor’s mission or goal from the
website?
4 Can you identify who works for the sponsor and who is the
author of the information presented on the website? Is there
information included for contacting them? Who reviews the
information? Is there an editorial board that reviews the
information included on the website?
4 Can you determine when the information was written?
4 Are statements made that are too good to be true? Do they
promise quick and miracle cures?  Do these cures extend to all
kinds of disorders and diseases?
Moreover, the authors trust that by publishing this work and its
second part in a journal with open access on the Internet and
sponsored by the Spanish Psychological Association, the correct
answers, within the limits of current scientific knowledge, to the
ideas that are presented in Tables 1 of this article and its second
part will be able to reach both patients and health professionals,
and, moreover, will serve as a reliable counterpoint to the truly
erroneous ideas about depression and its treatment that
proliferate on the Internet.
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